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The main objective of this article is to examine
the role and usefulness of public information
mechanisms, such as the rankings and similar
classiﬁcation instruments that are increasingly
relied upon to measure and compare the per-
formance of tertiary education institutions. The
article begins with a typology of ranking instru-
ments used for public accountability purposes,
followed by a discussion of the political econ-
omy of the ranking phenomenon. It then
attempts to assess their respective merits and
disadvantages and makes some recommenda-
tions for policy-makers, tertiary education insti-
tutions, and the public at large.
INTRODUCTION
In 1963, the University of California at Berke-
ley faculty and administration objected strongly
when the campus’ radical student newspaper,
the Cal Reporter, took the initiative to publish
student evaluations of their courses and profes-
sors.3 Despite this initial resistance, student
evaluations have steadily become part and par-
cel of many universities’ internal accountability
mechanisms, not only in the US but in a grow-
ing number of countries around the world.
Today, there are even websites where any stu-
dent can post a rating of his/her professors, no
matter where in the world.4 More generally,
over the past 20 years, universities that had tra-
ditionally enjoyed a considerable autonomy are
now being challenged to become more
accountable for their performance and the use
of public resources. Demands for increased
accountability of tertiary education institutions
have come not only from the students, but also
from other stakeholders such as governments
wary of rising costs, employers in need of com-
petent graduates, and the public at large eager
for information about the quality of education
and labour market prospects. 
Cyclical reviews, external evaluation by
peers, accreditation, inspection, audits, per-
formance contracts based on predetermined
indicators, benchmarking, and research assess-
ments are among the most common forms of
accountability. Some are initiated by the insti-
tutions themselves; some are imposed on tert-
iary education institutions externally by funding
bodies, quality assurance agencies, committees
of presidents and vice-chancellors, or by stake-
holders at large. An example of the latter are
institutional rankings by league tables. At this
point, there are no fewer than 30 noteworthy
rankings, ranging from broad rankings of
national universities, such as Maclean’s and
U.S.News and World Report, to comprehensive
international rankings, such as the Times
Higher Education Supplement (THES) and
Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU), to
research speciﬁc rankings, such as those of
New Zealand and the UK, and even to idiosyn-
cratic rankings such as the ‘most wired cam-
puses’ or ‘most politically active campuses’.
This does not even include the countless MBA
and other professional school rankings that
exist all over the world.
League tables, also referred to as institu-
tional rankings and report cards, are con-
structed by using objective and/or subjective
data obtained from institutions or from the pub-
lic domain, resulting in a ‘quality measure’
assigned to the unit of comparison relative to
its competitors. For the most part, the unit con-
sists of tertiary education institutions, which are
usually universities. However, these rankings
sometimes focus on a speciﬁc subject area or
programme shared by all the institutions. 
The range of indicators used in league tables
is intended to measure how the system is set up
(input variables), the way it functions and its
internal efficiency (process variables), and its
productivity and impact (output variables) rel-
ative to the performance of other universities
and programmes.5 Various media and other
agencies that conduct comparative rankings
place different levels of emphasis on the vari-
ables selected for comparison and this is most
apparent in the weighting they accord to the
indicators. Some rankings are done within a
class of universities, allowing institutions each
having a unique mission and orientation to
compete on a level playing ﬁeld.6 Others are
done in an across-the-board fashion, and yet
others compare only speciﬁc programmes
rather than institution as a whole. 
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The expansion of league tables and ranking exercises
has not gone unnoticed by the various stakeholders and
the reaction they elicit is rarely benign. Such rankings are
often dismissed by their many critics as irrelevant exer-
cises fraught with data and methodological ﬂaws, they
are boycotted by some universities angry at the results,
and they are used by political opponents as a convenient
way to criticize governments. One thing they do not do,
however is leave people unmoved. With leagues tables
becoming something of a growth industry, even in the
developing world, their accuracy, relevance and useful-
ness have become issues of concern. Are these tables
totally inappropriate measures of the quality of tertiary
education that should be discarded altogether? Can they
be adapted to become relevant to the information needs of
developing countries? Do they offer beneﬁt to use for
public policy, accountability, and consumer awareness?
To answer these questions, this paper examines league
tables and similar instruments that classify tertiary educa-
tion institutions with a particular focus on the role and
usefulness of these instruments as public information
mechanisms and as a measure of the quality of education
that institutions offer to their students. The article begins
with an analytical review of league tables, their value and
methodological ﬂaws, and controversies associated with
the enterprise. This background sets the stage for a dis-
cussion of the merits of the indicators used in league
tables as measures of quality. The ﬁnal section of the
paper explores the implications of league table rankings
for national policies and institutional practices in devel-
oping and industrial countries.
A TYPOLOGY OF RANKINGS AND RELATED
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
THE BEGINNING
In a recent comprehensive review of league tables, Usher
and Savino (2006) trace the origin of media-initiated
comparison of universities to 1981 and to Bob Morse at
the U.S. Media News Report. However, ranking of terti-
ary institutions by the news media seems to have been ini-
tiated some three decades earlier by Chesly Manly of the
Chicago Tribune. The ﬁrst ranking of tertiary institutions
by academics or educational organizations occurred even
before that, at the turn of the last century. Table I.5.1,
which is based in part on an article by Stuart (1995),
shows the evolution of this activity from 1870 to 1982, at
which point this exercise gained wider popularity and
became what it is today.
It is interesting to note that at the outset, academic
ranking of institutions was carried out as one of several
types of evaluation to determine institutional effective-
ness. Other approaches included accreditation, surveys,
self-studies, alumni studies, and evaluation of student
achievement and opinion (Pace and Wallace, 1954; Stuit,
1960). Also noteworthy is the importance placed on rep-
utation as a measure of quality and the peer review
process as a reliable source and mechanism for generat-
ing data upon which the rankings were calculated. For
instance, as early as 1959, Keniston’s methodology
involved asking 25 departmental chairs of institutions –
who were members of the Association of American Uni-
versities – to rate the strongest departments in their
respective ﬁelds, using the quality of PhD work and the
quality of the scholarship of faculty as primary criteria
(Stuit, 1960). 
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TABLE I.5.1
Chronology of Ranking Activities in the US from
1870–1982
1870–90 Commission of US Bureau of Education begins
publishing an annual report of statistical data,
classifying institutions.
1910 Association of American Universities urges the US
Bureau of Education to reinstate classifications.
1910–33 James Cattell, one of America’s first psychologists,
professor at the University of Pennsylvania and then
Columbia, publishes American Men of Science in
which he ranks institutions on the basis of the
number of eminent scientists associated with an
institution either as a student or a faculty member; he
also factors in the ratio of scientists in a given
institution to the total number of faculty. 
1925 Raymond Hughes, president of Miami University and
later chair of the American Council on Education and
its Committee on Graduate Instruction, publishes A
Study of the Graduate Schools of America in which
he uses a reputation-based ranking of 26 disciplines in
36 institutions.
1957 Chesley Manly of the Chicago Tribune publishes six
different rankings: ten best universities, coeducational
colleges, men’s colleges, women’s colleges, law
schools, and engineering schools. 
1959 Hayward Keniston of the University of Pennsylvania
publishes a ranking of 25 universities based on
reputation in a range of disciplines 
1966 Allan Cartter of the American Council on Education
publishes An Assessment of Quality in Graduate
Education which ranks 106 institutions.
1973–75 Blau and Margulies conduct a reputation ranking of
professional schools.
1982 The US National Academy of Science commissions an
assessment of research and doctoral programmes in
the US.
1982 Rankings begin to be extended to undergraduate
education (for example Fiske Guide to Colleges, 1982;
U.S.News and World Report, 1983, and so on).
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PATTERNS OF GROWTH
The systematic use of league tables as a widespread
phenomenon, however, has a history of less than a
decade. Eleven of the 19 league tables included in Usher
and Savino’s (2006) report have come into existence
since the year 2000. Among the exceptions in the list are
U.S.News and World Report, Canada’s Maclean’s Univ-
ersity Rankings, Poland’s Perspektywy/Rzeczpospolita
Uniwersytet, UK’s The Times Good University Guide,
and China’s Guagdong Institute of Management Science
Rankings which have had a more extended history. It
would not be farfetched to associate the proliferation in
league tables with the massification, or unprecedented
increase in enrolments, that is taking place in higher edu-
cation around the world. In addition, the ﬂood of cross-
border private and distance providers, the trend towards
internationalization of tertiary education, and the related
increase in stakeholder demand for greater accountabil-
ity, transparency, and efficiency have all contributed to
increased incentives for there to be ways to quantify
quality. Even the potential of economic gain for the prod-
ucers of rankings has been suggested as a reason for this
proliferation. 
A different way to look at patterns of growth in league
tables is to consider their regional concentration. Table
I.5.2 shows this distribution and additionally, provides
insight into the type of institution in each country that ini-
tiates the ranking. As can be discerned, the majority of
league tables are prepared and published by newspapers
and magazines (for example, as in Canada, France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States). However, they
can also be initiated by a government agency such as the
Ministry of Higher Education or University Grants Coun-
cil (for example as in the Netherlands, Pakistan, Thailand,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom), by independent
organizations (for example as in Germany and Spain), by
universities or professional associations (for example the
Shanghai Jiao Tong University ranking), or by accredita-
tion agencies (for example in Argentina). 
This table reveals that the proliferation of this activity
is not evenly extended across regions and countries. In
the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in
Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of Nigeria, league
tables are still non-existent. In contrast, they are increas-
ingly prevalent in industrial countries. 
The consequence of league table rankings varies
depending on the authority that conducts the exercise. In
the ﬁrst instance it can inﬂuence public opinion, as is the
case with magazine rankings. In some cases, rankings can
be deemed as one step in the accreditation process, such
as in Argentina or Pakistan. Finally, rankings of research
outputs, as practised in the UK and New Zealand, have a
direct impact on the level of government funding ﬂow-
ing to concerned institutions. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LEAGUE TABLES
Extensive discussions of typologies and critical analyses
of methodological ﬂaws associated with league tables are
available in a number of recent review articles (see, for
example, Bowden, 2000; Brooks, 2005; Dill and Soo,
2005; Liu and Liu, 2005; Provan and Abercromby, 2000;
Usher and Savino, 2006; Yonezawa, Nakatsui, and
Kobayashi, 2002). These reviews provide useful insight
into the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of
league tables, elaborate on the indicators used as meas-
ures of quality, and offer a critical assessment of the
methodologies involved and their respective shortcom-
ings. In the section below, the most salient points from
this literature are highlighted.
League tables share several common characteristics.
The ﬁrst is that they include a set of indicators or clusters
of indicators as proxies of quality. The most simpliﬁed
classiﬁcation of categories of indicators allows for input,
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TABLE I.5.2
Ranking Systems Worldwide (2006)
Region National and International
Ranking System
Eastern Europe and Central
Asia
Poland (C), Slovakia (B), Russia (B),
Ukraine (B) 
East Asia and Pacific Australia (B), China (B, IB), Hong
Kong (C), Japan (C), New Zealand
(A), Thailand (A)
Latin America and the
Caribbean
Argentina (D), Chile (C,D)
Middle East and North Africa Tunisia (A)
North America Canada (C), United States (C)
South Asia India (D), Pakistan (A)
Sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria (A)
Western Europe Germany7 (B,C), Italy (C),
Netherlands (A), Spain (B), United
Kingdom (A, B, IC)
Notes: A = Ranking prepared by government agency (Ministry of Higher
Education, Higher Education Commission, University Grants Council, and so on)
B = Ranking prepared by independent organization, professional association
or university
C = Ranking prepared and published by newspaper or magazine
D = Ranking prepared by accreditation agency
I = International ranking (IA, IB, IC and ID linking the international dimension
to the type of institution conducting the ranking).
Sources: World Bank data and following articles, Rocki, M. ( July 2005). Polish
rankings: Some mathematical aspects. Higher Education in Europe, 30(2),
pp. 173–82. Clarke, M. (July 2005). Quality assessment lessons from Australia
and New Zealand. Higher Education in Europe, 30(2), pp. 183–98. deMiguel,
J.M., Vaquera, E., and Sanchez, J. (July 2005). Spanish universities and the
Ranking 2005 initiative. Higher Education in Europe, 30(2), pp. 199–216. Liu,
N.C. and Liu, L. (July 2005). University rankings in China. Higher Education in
Europe, 30(2), pp. 217–28. WENR (September/October 2003). Nigeria: NUC
releases 2003 university rankings. Retrieved April 3, 2006, from http://www.
wes.org/ewenr/03Sept/Africa.htm.
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process, and output indicators. Usher and Savino (2006)
offer a more elaborate framework with seven sets of cat-
egories: (i) beginning characteristics (for example student
entry qualiﬁcations such as high school grade point 
average, selectivity, and so on); (ii) learning inputs (for 
example institutional resources, both ﬁnancial and mater-
ial, that are available to students and staff, nature of instit-
utional funding, and so on); (iii) learning inputs (for
example staff qualiﬁcations, ratio to students, workload
assignments, contact hours, and so on); (iv) learning out-
puts (for example skills sets gained, retention and com-
pletion rates); (v) ﬁnal outcomes (for example
employment rates, success rate in graduate school accept-
ance, job satisfaction, and so on); (vi) research (public-
ations, awards, citations, impact factor, research budgets,
research-based chairs, number of patents, and so on); and
(vii) reputation (for example from a range of perspectives
including those obtained from peers, academic admin-
istrators, and employers). The more reputable league
tables will typically include multiple measures for each
dimension. 
A second characteristic of league tables is that a
weighted score is accorded to each set or cluster of indica-
tors. The weightings vary across league tables and are more
a reﬂection of the view of the publisher of the table rather
than being grounded theoretically (Clarke, 2002). There is
general consensus that this is an arbitrary and subjective
element and is a fundamental ﬂaw in the methodology of
league tables (Brooks, 2005; Provan and Abercromby,
2000). The arbitrary nature is brought to light further with
the observation that weightings and ranking formula can
change from one year to the next as was the case with The
Times from 1992 to 1997 (Bowden, 2000). Also illustra-
tive in that respect is the letter that Stanford’s then presi-
dent, Gerhard Casper, wrote to U.S.News with a critique of
this exact issue (Casper, 1996). 
Clarke (2002) tracked four types of changes intro-
duced to the U.S.News rankings of graduate professional
schools as well as undergraduate liberal arts colleges over
a period of six years. She found that overall, 85 per cent
of the changes pertained to weight, deﬁnition, or method-
ology rather than the addition or deletion of indicators.
She also found that changes were less prevalent at the
undergraduate level as compared with graduate level pro-
fessional programmes and were more salient in some pro-
fessional rankings (for example law) than in others (for
example medicine). On average, there were 6–8 formula
changes in the six editions of the U.S.News rankings
reviewed in her study and most changes were concen-
trated in a small number of indicators. Clarke (2002) con-
cluded that changes introduced to each ranking formula
made it impossible to compare a given school’s perform-
ance over a period of several years based on the rankings
it obtained from one year to the next. Comparison, how-
ever, was possible if only a fraction of the indicators that
remained stable over time were taken into account.
A third characteristic pertains to the unit of compari-
son, which can be the institution or a particular pro-
gramme (for example MBA). The international league
tables consider the institution as the unit of comparison
and do not discriminate between the size or type of insti-
tution. At the national level, some league tables rank insti-
tutions in their category. For instance, Canada’s
Maclean’s ranks three categories of institutions: Med-
ical/Doctoral, Comprehensive, and Primarily Undergrad-
uate.8 The comparison of institutions that have different
missions and resources with one another has been ﬂagged
as a methodological ﬂaw and inappropriate (Eccles,
2002) as well a socially irresponsible undertaking
(Hodges, 2002). The practice also inadvertently disad-
vantages smaller institutions and those that are not
research-intensive and are thus less likely to get high
scores on indicators related to research and reputation
(Brooks, 2005). 
A fourth characteristic is the considerable reliance of
league tables on the peer review process for generating
data. Academic peers and administrators as well as
employers are asked to rank institutions based on their
view of institutional or programme reputation. Even
though the editor of the THES 2005 league table has
claimed stability in the process, others have criticized the
practice for a number of reasons: it is confounded, due to
a halo effect (Cartter, 1966; Diamond and Graham, 2000);
it is subjective, due to the absence of a common frame of
reference of quality for raters (Brooks, 2005); and it is
inaccurate because of the raters’ lack of familiarity with
programmes they have been asked to rate (Brooks and
Junn, 2002). League tables also use other types of data
including surveys and published data made available by
governments, citation indices, patent offices, and
esteemed institutions such as the Nobel Academy. 
With these characteristics in common, league tables
share important similarities to other approaches to insti-
tutional evaluation, such as accreditation. Many of the
indicators that probe into institutional resources, such as
faculty and student data and completion and retention
rates, are common in both. Similarly, the heavy reliance
on the peer review process is a shared attribute. 
Exercises such as rankings and accreditation proce-
dures are signiﬁcantly different, however, in that accred-
itation processes typically place greater emphasis on
programmes and measure institutional performance
against delineated, absolute standards and criteria. Per-
formance in league tables, on the other hand, is a relative
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matter as institutions or programmes are compared with
one another based on a set of criteria and the result is an
ordering by rank. Accreditation and institutional rank-
ings/league tables are also different in the degree of
emphasis they place on reputation and research output.
A THIN LINE BETWEEN LOVE AND HATE9
One thing is certain; rankings do not leave institutions and
stakeholders indifferent. If their publication is eagerly
anticipated by students, they are often dreaded by univer-
sity administrators. International rankings generate pride
and anger; the press and political parties are eager use
them as weapons against the government. In numerous
examples from around the world, governments and insti-
tutions have responded with words and deeds to the
power of university rankings.
In September 2005, for instance, after the latest league
table published by the Times Higher Education Supple-
ment showed Malaysia’s top two universities slipping by
almost 100 places compared with the previous year, the
leader of the opposition called for a Royal Commission of
Inquiry, notwithstanding the fact that the dramatic decline
was partly due to a change in the ranking methodology.10  
At times, ﬁerce controversies have erupted around
league tables and rankings, leading even to boycotts or
lawsuits. In the early 1990s, for example, a group of stu-
dent activists at Stanford University formed the ‘Forget
U.S. News Coalition’ in an unsuccessful attempt to per-
suade universities and colleges to join them in a boycott
of the U.S.News and World Report ranking. In 1997, the
president of Alma College in Central Michigan carried
out a survey of more than 150 university and college sen-
ior officials to establish their views about the U.S.News
and World Report rankings, in an unsuccessful attempt to
have them join him in boycotting the ranking (Provan and
Abercromby, 2000).
After Asiaweek published its first rankings of Asian
and Pacific region universities in 1997 and 1998, 35
universities refused to participate in the survey in 1999;
more than half were from Japan and China. The boycott
led to the actual termination of the initiative. Asiaweek
attributed the negative reactions partly to the fact that
many universities had taken offence to their low rank-
ing and partly to political motivations, as in the case of
some Chinese universities upset by the inclusion of Tai-
wanese universities in the ranking. Interestingly, the
University of Tokyo, which had been ranked number
one each time, also chose not to participate any more
after 1999. As explained by its president, Hasumi
Shigehiko, ‘the quality of our education and research
cannot be compared with that of other universities’
(Provan and Abercromby 2000). 
There have been controversies surrounding the
MacLean’s ranking of universities since it was ﬁrst intro-
duced in 1991 and these controversies continue to this
day. When it was ﬁrst published, it elicited strong nega-
tive reactions from the academic community for the poor
wording and design of its survey, for ranking all types of
institutions together irrespective of their mission, size,
and mandate, and for using a weighted index to arrive at
one global score without disclosing the methodological
framework. A number of changes, some fundamental,
were introduced to the survey in subsequent years.
Among them was the rewording of survey questions and
ranking universities in three categories of Doctoral/
Medical, Comprehensive, and Primarily Undergraduate.
Following the 1992 survey, Maclean’s also provided an
explanation about the methodology it used for the survey.
In 1993, Memorial and Carleton refused to participate in
the Maclean’s rankings as a protest to the methodology
used (MUN, 2 November 1995). The concerns of the aca-
demic community about the ﬂaws and methodological
shortcomings were collectively captured in a letter that
the newly installed vice-chancellor and principal of
McGill University, Bernard Shapiro, wrote to the then
coordinating editor of the Maclean’s annual university
rankings, Anne Dowsett Johnson, in 1994. In the same
year, 15 universities withdrew their participation from the
exercise and in 1995, the group of francophone universi-
ties in Quebec joined Memorial, Manitoba, Moncton as
non-participants. These universities, however, continued
to provide data similar to that requested by Maclean’s to
the Association of Colleges and Universities of Canada
(AUCC) for comparison purposes.
Most recently, Peter George, the president of McMas-
ter university, has suggested that ‘there are a lot of univer-
sities that are thinking about not participating in the fall
rankings’ carried out by Maclean’s despite the positive
effects rankings have had in standardizing data and iden-
tifying areas of strength and weaknesses (Drolet, 2006, p.
29). If the withdrawal of a number of top research univer-
sities including the University of Toronto from the gradu-
ate survey that Maclean’s has been conducting for the last
two years and the departure of Anne Dowsett Johnson
from Maclean’s are indications of growing discontent and
dissent on the part of major players, the Maclean’s annual
rankings may soon become history.
In March 2004, two universities in New Zealand suc-
cessfully sued the government to prevent the publication
of an international ranking that found them poorly placed
in comparison with their British and Australian competi-
tors. The vice-chancellors were concerned that the rank-
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ings would negatively affect their ability to attract fee-pay-
ing international students. In the end, the government was
allowed to publish only the rankings of the national terti-
ary education institutions without comparing them to their
peer institutions overseas. The rankings focused on the
research performance of the 5570 researchers in New
Zealand’s 22 tertiary education institutions (Cohen, 2004).
A similar situation has developed in the Netherlands,
although the controversy has been less public than else-
where.11 After the Ministry of Education prepared its ﬁrst
set of rankings in 2005 and shared them with the con-
cerned universities, one of the most prestigious univer-
sities of the country, outraged at finding itself with a
lower than expected ranking, threatened to sue the Min-
ister. In the end, the university did not go to court but the
Ministry still went ahead and made the rankings public
on its website.
Opponents question every element of the rankings,
from the very principle of participating in an exercise
seen as a typical product of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture
obsessed with competitiveness or as an intolerable
infringement on the universities’ independence, to a sys-
tematic criticism of ﬂawed methodologies, including the
conceptual design of the surveys, the choice of indicators,
the relative weight attached to each indicator, and the
databases on which the rankings are based. The results
are often dismissed as irrelevant or wrong. In many – if
not most – cases the criticisms have come from institu-
tions dissatisﬁed with their position in the rankings. Iron-
ically, universities with good results increasingly use the
rankings as advertisement arguments, especially those
trying to attract overseas students.
When institutions have chosen not to participate in
ranking exercises, the consequence has not always been
negative or harmful to the institution. Reed College’s
experience in the US is a case in point. After its refusal to
submit data to U.S.News and World Report, it found itself
among the lowest ranking colleges in the country, based
on estimates compiled by the magazine. However, its
pool of applicants since the ranking not only increased
signiﬁcantly but it also found that students with higher
SATs were applying and being accepted. Today, Reed
College is considered among the best and most selective
liberal arts college in the US.12
AND THE WINNER IS…
There’s always an easy solution to every human
problem – neat, plausible, and wrong.
(H.L. Mencken)
Is the ranking exercise a fair game with unbiased rules for
all institutions? It only takes a close look at the top 100
institutions on two international rankings carried out in
2005, the SJTU and the THES, to discern that this is not
the case. There are several common features shared
among high ranking institutions that raise serious doubts
about the validity of international league tables. 
The ﬁrst is that successful institutions in both league
tables are located in countries where English is either the
official language or the language of instruction. In the
SJTU 2005 world rankings, 68 of the top 100 universities
were located in English-speaking countries (53 in the US;
11 in the UK; 4 in Canada). Similarly, in the 2005 THES
world rankings, 60 of the top 100 universities were
located in English-speaking countries (31 in the US; 13 in
the UK; 12 in Australia; 3 in Canada; and 1 in New
Zealand). Moreover, an additional 11 universities in the
top 100 rankings conducted at least some of their gradu-
ate programmes in English (Denmark, Finland, Israel, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). And
these nations, along with institutions of India, Singapore,
and Hong Kong, with graduate programmes offered in
English, account for an additional 16 institutions in the
THES top 100.
The second common feature is that the majority of
institutions ranked in the top 100 in the two international
rankings are located in countries that conduct national
rankings of their own institutions such as the US, UK,
Canada, Australia, Japan, and China (Table I.5.3). It is
reasonable to deduce that familiarity with rankings and a
well developed capacity to compile and report data can
provide institutions with an edge in international league
tables. Italy and Spain are exceptions in that despite local
experience, they were not ranked in the top 100 in the
THES and only Italy ranked 97th in the SJTU.
Universities in North America and Europe combined
comprised 92 per cent of the top 100 rankings of SJTU.
In this exercise, Japan was the only country outside the
Western world with ﬁve universities ranked in the top
100. In the THES rankings, the distribution was more
even across universities in the Americas, Europe, and the
Asia/Paciﬁc region. Tables I.5.2 and I.5.3, viewed
together, highlight stark regional disparities and, in par-
ticular, the absence of nationally initiated rankings in
some regions. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that no uni-
versity made it to the top 200 ranking by THES or to the
top 500 by SJTU from countries and regions that do not
have their own tradition of ranking tertiary institutions.
A third feature is the research capacity of the institu-
tion supported by research funding and endowments and
direct and indirect national investment earmarked for in
higher education R&D expenditure. For instance, top-
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ranking Canadian universities in international rankings
are also the top universities in research income (Statistics
Canada and CAUBO).13 Similarly, countries where the
tertiary education R&D expenditure as a percentage of
total domestic R&D is high, stand a better chance of hav-
ing the required resources to compete favourably in inter-
national rankings.14 Clearly, international rankings favour
research-intensive universities at the cost of excluding
excellent institutions that are primarily undergraduate
institutions and even those that are classiﬁed as Compre-
hensive despite having extensive research activities and
a wide range of programmes at the graduate level. The
top three universities in the Comprehensive category in
Maclean’s 2005 rankings compared with the THES and
SJTU rankings speak to this disadvantage (Table I.5.4).
Similarly, the process favours elite private institutions.
‘The University of Osaka can be regarded as a top public
institution that has improved its prestige and performance
for almost thirty years. Even so, it would be almost
impossible for it to be ranked above the University of
Kyoto or the University of Tokyo’(Yonezawa et al., 2002,
p. 381). Countries where institutions secure a large pro-
portion of their funding from private sources also stand
out in international rankings. These include Australia
(with about 52 per cent private funding), Japan (around
51 per cent), the United States (about 45 per cent),
Canada (about 42 per cent), and the UK (about 28 per
cent) (OECD Statistics).
The points highlighted above raise serious questions
about the validity of the impact of league tables on
national and institutional policies, depending on the value
that countries or institutions place on international or
national rankings. For instance, if most top-ranking insti-
tutions are English-speaking, will it be necessary for any
institution aspiring to obtain higher rankings will have to
consider adopting English as the language of instruction
despite a strong desire to strengthen national identity, as
is the case in Malaysia? Should national governments
increase investments in higher education and R&D if they
wish to see their institutions improve in the rankings? If
internationalization is an important element in league
tables, should they support student and staff mobility pro-
grammes such as ERASMUS MUNDUS, Canada-US-
Europe Mobility, and NAFTA Mobility programmes?
Should all countries implement national rankings to pre-
pare their universities for this activity at an international
level? Should all institutions be encouraged to increase
their revenues and seek to privatize their sources of fund-
ing in order to be able to provide the requisite resources
for improved institutional performance as measured by
receiving higher ranking? 
DO LEAGUE TABLES MEASURE QUALITY?
It is true that left-wing CEOs and ﬂying ﬁshes do exist,
but neither is exactly representative of its species.
(Michel Audiart)
The correlation between the indicators used in league
tables and indicators of educational quality remains an
illusive one for several reasons. Most signiﬁcantly, there
is no commonly accepted static deﬁnition of quality that
would ﬁt all institutions, regardless of type and mission.
With a few exceptions (for example Maclean’s, U.S.News
and World Report) league tables treat all universities
alike. Turner (2005) has asserted that in the absence of
both absolute standards of efficiency and the ability to
differentiate between inputs, process, and outputs, league
tables end up comparing institutions via a dissimilar set of
comparators (p. 353).
Another reason is that there is little theoretical or
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TABLE I.5.3 
Top 100 International Rankings in 2005 by Region
and Date of Initiation or Duration of Ranking
Exercise
Regions SJTU THES National League Tables
Americas
US
Canada 
Mexico
57
53
4
0
35
31
3
1
U.S.News and World Report (1983)
Maclean’s (1991)
Europe
UK
Continental 
Europe*
35
11
24
36
15
21
The Times Good University Guide
(1993)
La Repubblica, Europe – Italy (2000)
Excelencia, Europe – Spain (2001)
Asia/Pacific
Australia
New Zealand
Japan
China
Hong Kong
Singapore
India
South Korea
8
2
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
29
12
1
3
4
3
2
2
1
Asiaweek (1997–2000) 
Asahi Shimbun (1994)
Guangdong Institute of Manage-
ment Science (1993) ; Netbig (1999) 
Note: * Number represents institutions spread throughout 17 countries in the
ranking and 22 countries in the THES ranking.
TABLE I.5.4
Canadian Universities, Rankings across Different
League Tables
Maclean’s top 3 universities in
Comprehensive category
THES SJTU
1- Waterloo 159 293
2- Victoria – 291
3- Guelph – 256
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empirical justiﬁcation to link the typical range of cate-
gories of indicators used in league tables – for example,
reputation, faculty research productivity, and student
experiences and outcome – with quality (Brooks, 2005).
Pike (2004), for instance, found that the National Survey
of Student Engagement data does not bear a strong rela-
tionship to U.S.News rankings, which indicates that stu-
dents’ impressions of their educational experiences are
inﬂuenced by different inputs than the institutional char-
acteristics measured in the rankings (p. 14).
Moreover, the methodologies used to generate an
aggregate and global score based on indicators that have
completely different scales are theoretically ﬂawed,
excessively simplistic, and ‘in mathematical terms …
indefensible’(Turner, 2005, p. 355). Table I.5.5 shows the
categories of indicators as classiﬁed by Usher and Savino
(2006) in the left-hand column and empirical support for
the indicator as a measure of quality gleaned from the
existing literature in the right-hand column. The text in
italics highlights empirical studies that do not support the
indicator as a measure of quality.
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TABLE I.5.5
Literature Review of Rankings Indicators as Measures of Quality
Usher and Savino (2006) Empirical studies retrieved from the literature
Beginning characteristics
Attributes and abilities of
incoming students
Performance on national
standardized tests
Per cent receiving
scholarships
Institutional selectivity
International students
 High school GPA correlates positively with academic performance (Hoschel and Kozeny, 1997; Houglum et
al., 2005; Jensen, 1989; Meeker, 1994)
 Subscales of American College Test correlate positively with academic performance
 Past performance is the best predictor of academic success (Himmel, 1967)
 A review of nine studies considered the predictive validity of the SAT for Canadian post-secondary
institutions. It confirmed that at best the SAT can be used as a supplement to high school GPA, and should
only be used cautiously in predicting academic success (Jenkins, 1992). 
 Approaches to Studying Inventory15 contributed to the prediction of freshman grades beyond entry
achievement (Watkins, 1986)
 Age and gender are predictors of academic success 
 For students of colour, non-cognitive variables are better predictors of academic success (Ting Siu-man, 2003).
 No empirical evidence was found that internationalization is correlated with improved quality (Marijk C. van
der Wende, no date (retrieved March 24 from http://www.ipv.pt/millenium/wende11.htm#um 
Learning inputs: resources
Financial and material
resources available
Funding (public and private)
 No empirical studies were found to support this category of indicators. It could be asserted, however, that
indicators such as average SAT scores, proportion of students in top 10 per cent of high-school graduating
class, faculty resources, student selectivity, financial resources, and alumni giving, systematically privilege a
certain type of institution. Institutions that are highly selective, have low faculty/student ratios, and enjoy
high rates of annual giving are most often private universities. 
Learning inputs: staff
Faculty student ratio
How faculty are deployed 
Contact hours
Staff qualifications
 Favourable student–staff ratios, a high proportion of graduating students continuing on to further study, and
a high proportion of research-qualified staff account for a large proportion of variability in research
performance (Ramsden, 1999).
 Satisfaction with faculty was found to be a significant predictor of GPA in sophomore year (Graunke and
Woosley, 2005).
Learning outputs
Skill sets gained
Retention
Completion rates
 Graduates’ experiences of low-quality courses, good student progress rates and low attrition with high
graduate employability account for a large proportion of the variability in research performance which can be
attributed to two latent constructs (Ramsden, 1999).
 While causes of attrition and successful completion have been fleshed out, programme quality cannot be
judged exclusively by measures of effectiveness because satisfaction with one’s degree and the usefulness of
a programme’s experiences also contribute to educational quality. Other contributing factors to successful
completion include structures of financial support, levels of scholarly productivity, types of professional
socialization,[and] rate of academic progress. (Ramsden, 1999, p. 13).
Final outcomes
Employment rates
Per cent returning for
graduate studies
Income
Job satisfaction
Being a good citizen
 Studies have looked at students’ educational experiences and their civic and employment outcomes.
Although findings are generally positive, the criticism forwarded is that samples used are not national and
have left out Master’s and professional school students (Bowen and Bok, 1998).
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There is also a concern about how the plethora of indi-
cators are chosen and whether they are valid and reliable
in addition to being comprehensive in terms of measuring
quality (Brooks, 2005; Clarke, 2002; Dill and Soo, 2005).
Ranking systems’ authors believe that each indicator
is a reasonable proxy for quality and that, suitably
aggregated and weighted, these indicators constitute a
plausible, holistic ‘deﬁnition’ of quality. What our
results here show is that most indicators are probably
epiphenomena of some underlying feature that is not
being measured a hidden X factor, which might be the
age of the institution, faculty size, per student
expenditures. (Usher and Savino, 2005, pp. 32–3)
Finally, ﬁndings are often inconsistent with regard to
whether league tables are attempting to measure the same
construct. In a comparative study, Dill and Soo (2005)
took into account four dimensions (namely input, process,
output, and reputation variables) to ascertain the degree of
convergence (that is, conceptual representation of qual-
ity) between the ﬁve league tables they had selected for
their study.16 They concluded that there was convergence
among the different league tables primarily because they
included more or less the same input measures (for 
example faculty, students, ﬁnancial resources and facil-
ities). The divergence in process and output measures
apparently did not inﬂuence their conclusion. In a more
recent comparative study, however, Usher and Savino
(2006) have reported contradictory ﬁndings. Examining
the indicators used across 19 league tables, they assert
that there is no convergence in the way quality is concep-
tualized by league tables. They associate the discrepancy
between their ﬁndings and past ﬁndings with both the fact
of their larger sample (19 league tables) and the wider
range of categories of indicators based upon which com-
parisons were done (7 clusters of indicators). 
Another measure of inconsistency is the yield of rank-
ings across various tables. Looking at the top 50 institu-
tions ranked on the THES and SJTU rankings, only 42 per
cent appear on both lists: only one institution received the
same ranking; 24 per cent were within a range of 5 posi-
tions; 8 per cent within 10 positions; and 22 per cent were
more than 10 positions apart. Comparing the rankings
given to Canadian universities in the THES and Maclean’s
rankings in the year 2005, the results were identical in the
ranking of the top two institutions. Between Maclean’s
and SJTU, only one institution shared a common ranking,
in the sixth position. In general, rankings were closer up to
number eight and completely scattered beyond. 
It is also enlightening to compare the results of accred-
itation and rankings in countries where data is available
for that purpose. In South Africa, for example, the daily
newspaper the Financial Mail has compiled and pub-
lished a ranking of MBAs for several years. In 2005, the
Commission of Higher Education’s accreditation arm
conducted an assessment of all MBAs in South Africa and
ended up closing down a third of the existing pro-
grammes, including two foreign ones. Another third got
only conditional accreditation. Interestingly, there was lit-
tle correspondence between the rankings and the outcome
of the accreditation process. In fact, quite a few among
the shut down programmes were among the highest
ranked MBAs. Since that episode, the Financial Mail has
adjusted its methodology and changed the relative
weights of indicators.
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TABLE I.5.5
cont’d
Usher and Savino (2006) Empirical studies retrieved from the literature
Research
Publication and citations
(bibliometrics)
Academic quality of
research (third party)
Research budgets
Research-based chairs
Number of patents
 In the discipline of education, three main indicators, journal articles, books, and large research grants, all of
which are subject to refereeing processes, accounted for 81 per cent of the total variance in research
productivity (Print and Hattie, 1997). 
 A smaller number of frequently cited papers enhance reputational capital more than a greater number of less
frequently cited papers (Moore et al., 2001).
 Certain types of articles are cited more frequently, which disadvantages certain disciplines and depicting a
distorted view of institutional quality (Bergh et al., 2005)
 A major problem concerning this set of variables is what is counted as a significant publication source. Not
all disciplines value the same kind of publication or publication source. 
 The criteria of ‘faculty awards’ and National Academy membership set the bar too high for most universities
to identify quality and furthermore exclude a wide range of activities undertaken by faculty in most
institutions. Moreover, as the indicators look at productivity rather than quality they favour large
programmes.
Reputation
Surveys of employers,
academics, and academic
administrators
 Based on alumni surveys and graduate employment records, employability is linked to one’s degree rather
than being based on whether one attended university (Article in Times Higher Education Supplement,
Goddard et al., 1999)
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CAN RANKINGS BE USED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE
WAY?
How does one explain the passion for university rankings,
despite the fact that they have so many conceptual and
methodological limitations? What advice should be given
to governments, tertiary education institutions, and the
public at large for using the information provided by
rankings in a constructive and critical way?
AT THE GOVERNMENT LEVEL: RANKINGS AS PROXY FOR
QUALITY ASSURANCE MECHANISM
In countries without established evaluation or accredita-
tion mechanisms, rankings can be used effectively to mon-
itor and enhance quality, as the examples of Germany and
Pakistan illustrate. In 1990, after the fall of the Berlin Wall,
teams of academics from the West German Science Coun-
cil were given the task of evaluating their counterparts in
East German universities. As they proceeded to perform
this mission, they realized that, in the absence of a tradi-
tion of evaluation in West German universities, they had
to invent an appropriate methodology as they went. 
More recently, the ranking exercise conducted since
1998 by the Centre for Higher Education Development
(Centrum für Hochschulenentwicklung), an independent
policy research agency, along with the German Acade-
mic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Aus-
tausch Dienst) and their media partner Die Zeit has
become the first comprehensive system providing a
panorama of quality indicators in Germany, a federal
country where the main responsibilities for ﬁnancing and
overseeing the universities belong to the states. The sur-
vey incorporates data on a total of 132 universities and
148 technological institutes (Fachhochschulen), and
more than 210,000 students and around 21,000 profes-
sors have participated (http://www.daad.de/deutschland/
studium/hochschulranking/04690.en.html). Instead of
calculating a global ranking of institutions based on
weighted indicators as the THES and SJTU do, CHE
presents detailed survey data from thousands of teachers
and students as well as third-party data, in addition to
dealing with the universities and the technological insti-
tutes separately. To facilitate using the information gen-
erated by the collected data, the CHE rankings provide
ﬁve main categories of indicators, along with sub-group-
ings. These include: 
 Academic studies and teaching (e-learning, contact
between students, students–teacher contact, courses
offered, organization of courses, practical semester
support, counselling, teaching evaluation); 
 Equipment/capital resources (PC equipment, media
equipment, classrooms, library facilities, workstations); 
 Labour market and career-orientation (programmes
related to the labour market); 
 Overall opinion of students and professors (overall
assessment, research reputation, professors’ (insider)
tips; 
 Research (doctorates, internationally visible publica-
tions, other publications, third-party funding; and 
 Study location and higher education institution (intra-
mural-level sports, low rent/cost of living, small col-
lege location, intercollegiate sports.
Anyone who wants to consult the data (published by
the German newspaper Die Zeit and also available on
line at www.daad.de) can look at the standing of each
university, or even a speciﬁc academic subject, against a
particular indicator or set of indicators.17 Readers can
even constitute their own ranking based on the indica-
tors most relevant to them. The approach developed by
CHE presents the additional advantage of avoiding data
biases linked to self-reporting by universities. The Aus-
trian and Swiss universities have recently joined this
exercise, accepting to be benchmarked against the Ger-
man universities, with the exception of the Austrian med-
ical schools that have participated but refused to have
their results published.
In Pakistan, after a national Task Force set up in 2000
presented a distressing diagnosis of the tertiary education
situation in the country – one of the lowest enrolment
rates in the world (3 per cent), poor quality, insufficient
funding – the government launched a large-scale reform
spearheaded by the newly established Higher Education
Commission (HEC). Besides drastic changes in gover-
nance and ﬁnancing arrangements (election of university
leaders, creation of Boards of Trustees, increased ﬁnanc-
ing, introduction of a funding formula, and so on), the
reform also envisages setting up an accreditation agency
to monitor and enhance quality in both public and private
universities in Pakistan. But conscious that it will take a
few years to effectively accredit a signiﬁcant number of
programmes, the HEC decided to carry out a ranking
exercise as a shortcut to assess the quality of existing ter-
tiary education institutions.18
The ranking of universities in Pakistan developed out
of a direct mandate given to the HEC in 2002 to evalu-
ate the universities in a way that would promote the rapid
and comprehensive development of the entire tertiary
education system, in particular so as to lend support to
the country’s place in the world economy (http://www.
hec.gov.pk/quality/Mandate.htm). By comparing the
inputs and outputs of the nation’s institutions, Pakistan
has established a mechanism for rewarding excellence
and investing in improvement in institutions that are cur-
rently lacking. The ﬁve main ranking criteria used by the
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HEC are similar to ranking indicators in many other
nations. The breakdown of indicators is (i) faculty (25
per cent); (ii) research output (25 per cent); (iii) students
(20 per cent); (iv) facilities available (15 per cent); and
(v) funding (15 per cent). The fact that these rankings
favour research output and faculty qualifications over
other indicators such as the quality of student inputs and
campus infrastructure may imply that Pakistan has fully
adopted the Western ideals for universities, and this
weighting of indicators certainly warrants further debate
about its relevance for developing Pakistan’s tertiary
education system today.
The Advisory Committee overseeing this ranking
exercise, comprising HEC officials and university rep-
resentatives, had to decide whether or not the results
should be made public. Under vehement protests from
one of the leading vice-chancellors, whose (public) uni-
versity had scored very low, the Committee agreed not to
publish the results. What HEC did instead was to share
key benchmarking data with each university, notably its
relative position against each criterion used in the rank-
ings. For example, University X was told that, with
respect to the proportion of professors with a doctorate,
it scored in the lowest quartile compared with all univer-
sities in Pakistan. 
Despite the general outcry against the publication of
the results of the rankings, this experience has had at least
two positive consequences. In the ﬁrst place, it has forced
the universities to take data collection much more 
seriously. When confronted with the ﬁrst draft of ranking
results, most university representatives dismissed them,
arguing that the data was blatantly wrong. But when it
was proved to them that the data was exactly that submit-
ted by their respective university, they realized the impor-
tance of collecting and sharing accurate data. It appears
that the second round of data collection has yielded a
much more reliable set of data.
These rankings have allowed the government, for the
ﬁrst time in the history of Pakistan, to engage in a profes-
sional dialogue on the quality of education with its uni-
versities via an instrument that has been developed jointly
by both partners. Imperfect as these HEC rankings may
be, the conversation around speciﬁc factors that are some-
how related to the quality of teaching and learning is an
important ﬁrst step towards developing a culture of qual-
ity in the Pakistani tertiary education system. It should
also be noted that some of the criteria included in the cal-
culation of the rankings, such as the proportion of profes-
sors with a PhD, are also part of the new funding formula
used for allocating the budget to public universities.
It is important to stress that governments cannot
expect universities and other tertiary education instit-
utions to work towards improving the quality and rele-
vance of their programmes unless they enjoy sufficient
autonomy so as to be able to introduce signiﬁcant reforms
to their syllabuses and teaching reforms on their own ini-
tiative. Having access to additional resources to support
these reforms, including the ability to fund the recruit-
ment of top professors/researchers from around the coun-
try or from overseas, is also essential. In the case of
Pakistan, for instance, the Higher Education Commission
has set up several ﬁnancial windows to help those univer-
sities willing to upgrade the quality of their programmes.
UTILIZATION BY TERTIARY EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS:
RANKINGS AS A BENCHMARKING TOOL
In spite of the controversial nature of rankings, there
seems to be a persistent desire on the part of universities
to assert their international rank by the position they
clinch on league tables. In the year 2000, the University
of Toronto’s president expressed that he was ‘both
relieved and gratiﬁed that we have once again received
the number one ranking among research universities in
Canada’ (The Bulletin, 2000, cited in Provan and Aber-
cromby, 2000, p. 4). Universities in emerging economies
are equally eager to become ‘world-class’ universities,
and they usually deﬁne their goal as being recognized
among the top universities in international rankings.
Rankings are increasingly used by institutions for
goal-setting purposes, as the following example illus-
trates. Clemson University, a land grant university in
South Carolina traditionally focused on agriculture and
mechanical engineering, has undertaken a radical process
of transformation in recent years. Based on an in-depth
analysis of the transformation of South Carolina into one
of the leading automotive regions in the US, Clemson
University formed a strategic partnership with BMW
with the aim of recreating itself as the premier university
for automotive and motor sports research and education
in the United States. Its new vision statement speciﬁcally
mentions the target of becoming one of the nation’s top-
20 public universities (as measured by U.S.News and
World Report), up from rank 74 four years ago and 34 in
2005 (Przirembel, 2005).
Marc (2004) examined the impact of the U.S.News
and World Report rankings on a variety of variables and
concluded that even though rankings have differential
impact on public and private schools, ‘many schools’
admission outcomes are responsive to movements in the
rankings’. The following two excerpts from the minutes
of Senate and Board of Governors meetings of two Cana-
dian universities illustrate well the extent to which rank-
ings are deemed important and ways in which the highest
academic bodies seek to respond to them.
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If rankings prompt a retrospective analysis of institu-
tional performance, leading to setting goals to support
institutional and national visions, then they can be consid-
ered as having had a positive impact toward improvement.
For instance, countries such as Japan have found rankings
carried out at the national level to be a useful exercise,
forcing systematic data collection, and benchmarking, and
leading to implementation of important reforms toward
quality improvement (Yonezawa et al., 2002). 
As the relative score on various indicators show, insti-
tutions can excel in different areas even though their over-
all ranking may convey a different message. 
The various disciplines also throw up different
leaders. Academics see Harvard as preeminent in the
arts, medicine and social sciences, but Cambridge
leads in the sciences and MIT in technology. Such
variety of outcomes underlines that universities have
different missions and different strengths that make
them difficult to compare. There is no sign that a
high-ranking university in our table is better than one
more lowly ranked. (Times Higher Education
Supplement University Rankings, 2005, p. 2)
One of the major risks of relying on ranking results is
when the exercise becomes the goal itself instead of serv-
ing as a measure of progress towards achieving quality. It
would be to the advantage of academic institutions to take
a proactive role in identifying indicators that are true meas-
ures of quality education. Academics, after all, possess the
expertise and know-how to arrive at evidence-based con-
clusions. By generating meaningful and appropriate indi-
cators of teaching quality, they can begin to take a resolute
step towards realizing the scholarship of all academic activ-
ities including research, teaching and learning (Boyer,
1990). Institutions also have a role in this regard: they need
to assume a leadership role in collaborating with media,
governments, and other agencies that initiate rankings so as
to ensure that the vision of quality used in rankings is
grounded both theoretically and empirically, is comprehen-
sive, and is mutual across stakeholders. 
Within universities, departments and academic units
are in the best position to identify the peers with whom
they choose to benchmark their own performance. If insti-
tutions want to be recognized as high-performing, they
must also be able to provide the resources to their units
in order to enable them to benchmark with their strongest
peers. By being explicit about their mission, honest about
their performance, and transparent about the way in
which they use their resources, institutions as well as aca-
demic units can be much more effective in delivering
what the popular media set out to do by disseminating
league tables widely. 
WHEN THE PUBLIC APPLIES PRESSURE
Often criticized for using rankings as a gimmick to boost
sales, the press can, however, play a genuinely proactive
role in education by making relevant information avail-
able to the public, as the Colombian accreditation expe-
rience illustrates. Colombia was the ﬁrst country in Latin
America to set up a national accreditation system in the
mid-1990s, but the number of programmes reviewed by
the new accreditation agency remained relatively low in
the first years because the accreditation law made the
process voluntary and the most prestigious universities,
public and private, did not feel any compulsion to par-
ticipate. Starting in 2000, however, after the country’s
main newspaper, El Tiempo, started to publish the full
list of accredited programmes twice a year to help stu-
dents choose among the various offerings, the univer-
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Laurentian University
Minutes of 204th Regular Meeting of the
Board of Governors of November 29, 2002
3.2 Maclean’s Rankings
Dr. Woodsworth reported on the encouraging
results published in Maclean’s, and further that
our institution has improved in a number of
categories including Alumni support and the
reputational survey. A special meeting of the
Management Team has been called to discuss
mechanisms and methods to improve the Uni-
versity’s performance in the rankings (retrieved
on May 6, 2006, from http://www.
laurentian.ca/president/governors/minutes_e.
php?id=204).
Simon Fraser University
Senate Meeting of December 1, 1997
14. Classes Taught by Tenured Faculty
Reference was made to the Maclean’s issue
relating to university ratings. Although it was
nice to see that Simon Fraser University was
ranked at the top of the overall ranking in the
comprehensive category for the second year
in a row, concern was expressed about the
low ranking SFU received in the ‘First Year
Classes Taught by Tenured Faculty' category.
Senate was advised that the Maclean’s infor-
mation is provided by Analytical Studies and
SFU has consistently been below 40 per cent
in this category in recent years. Senate was
informed that the Vice-President Academic
has previously raised this issue with the Deans
and that these statistics were of concern to his
office. The methodology used by Maclean’s to
collect and analyze the data was questioned
and the Vice-President Academic was asked
to make further investigations into this issue
(retrieved: May 6, 2006 – http://www.
sfu.ca/Senate/archives-Senate/SenateMinutes
97/Sum_1297.html).
Box I.5.1 Excerpts from Senate and Board of Governors’ meetings in Canadian universities
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sities have felt increasing pressure to join the accredita-
tion process as students have showed a marked prefer-
ence for accredited programmes.
One of the principal merits of rankings is that they
stimulate a public discussion of critical issues affecting
the tertiary education system that are often ignored either
for lack of a broader perspective or out of reluctance to
challenge established practices or vested interests. Agood
example is the debate that started in France when the
Shanghai Jiao Tong University world rankings were pub-
lished for the ﬁrst time. After observing that the best
French university was ranked 65th, the daily paper Le
Monde ran an article on 24 January 2004 entitled ‘The
great misery of French universities’. Surprisingly, none
of the university presidents or union leaders interviewed
for this article criticized either the principle of calculating
a ranking or the methodology of the SJTU ranking.
Instead, they focused on the problems facing their insti-
tutions, looking especially at the lack of budgetary
resources as one of the main explanations for the demise
of the French university system. 
A few months later, one of the country’s leading edu-
cation economists, François Orivel, wrote a very lucid
article analysing the reasons why French universities are
not internationally competitive (Orivel, 2004). One of the
principal factors identiﬁed was the fact that French uni-
versities are not allowed to select the most academically
qualiﬁed students. A unique feature of the French tertiary
education system is the dual structure that separates the
top schools (Grandes Ecoles), which recruit the best stu-
dents through very competitive national examinations,
and the universities to which all secondary school grad-
uates have automatic access. Since the Grandes Ecoles
are predominantly elite professional schools that conduct
very little research, most doctoral students in the research
universities do not come from the most academically
qualiﬁed student groups, unlike the practice in more suc-
cessful university systems in the US, the UK or Japan.
The other important factor is the absolute lack of compe-
tition among universities. All universities are treated
equally in terms of budget and assignment of personnel,
with the result that there are very few centres of excel-
lence with a large concentration of top researchers.
Another interesting example comes from Brazil
where, in the mid-1990s, the Minister of Education intro-
duced an assessment test meant to compare the quality of
undergraduate programmes across universities. In a way,
it could be described as a ranking exercise in the sense
that university programmes could be ranked based on the
average score of their participating students. Even though
the Provão was voluntary and did not count towards the
marks of graduating students, at ﬁrst it met with a lot of
opposition and resistance. The students were reluctant to
take the test, and the universities themselves were not
keen to encourage their students to participate, especially
after the ﬁrst rounds showed that some of the top public
universities had scored less than expected while some stu-
dents from lesser known private universities had achieved
good results. However, over time, the Provão became
more accepted and, employers increasingly asked job
applicants to share their test results, which became a very
strong incentive for students to participate.19 Similarly,
in Nigeria, after the University Grants Council initiated a
ranking of professional programmes, employers started
to regain conﬁdence in local universities and to hire grad-
uates of the highest ranked engineering programmes.
CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD 
I come to the dialogue about rankings with a good
deal of skepticism about their ability to serve as
effective indicators of institutional quality. But I think
it’s fair to say that whether or not colleges and
universities agree with the various ranking systems
and league tables ﬁndings is largely irrelevant.
Ranking systems clearly are here to stay. As a result,
I’ve come to the conclusion that it is important to
learn all that we can about how these ranking systems
work, and to provide a framework for those who do
ranking so that they can improve and enhance their
methodologies. (Jamie P. Merisotis, President,
Institute for Higher Education Policy, at a meeting of
the Council for Higher Education Accreditation, 
26 January 2006)
The world seems to be obsessed with rankings in every
walk of life. Countries are ranked for their performance
in every possible domain, from the Olympics to their
quality of life. Even Mozart’s musical pieces are being
ranked as the planet celebrates the 250th anniversary of
his birth. It is not surprising, then, that, at the present, ter-
tiary education is characterized by increased global com-
petition for students, the number of league tables of
universities has grown rapidly in recent years. Govern-
ments and the public at large are ever more preoccupied
with the relative performance of tertiary education insti-
tutions and achieving the best perceived value as con-
sumers of education. Just as scarcity, prestige, and having
access to ‘the best’ increasingly mark the purchase of
goods such as cars, handbags, and blue jeans, so, too, are
the consumers of tertiary education looking for indicators
that enhance their capacity to identify and access the best
in tertiary education.
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Many analysts consider ranking across countries
meaningless given the huge differences in essential char-
acteristics of tertiary systems and their respective social
and cultural contexts. Sources of funding, governance
patterns, degree of management autonomy, differences in
institutional missions, availability of reliable data, and the
potential to manipulate statistics are important dimen-
sions that contribute to variation and support their claim
for the meaninglessness of this activity.
Notwithstanding their controversial nature and
methodological shortcomings, university rankings have
become widespread and are unlikely to disappear. Possi-
ble reactions, in the face of this rapidly expanding phe-
nomenon, are to ignore, dismiss, or boycott any form of
ranking. Another, less extreme response is one that seeks
to analyse and understand the signiﬁcance and limitations
of ranking exercises. The recent international experience
with league tables, which this article has tried to review,
provides a set of lessons that can help policy-makers,
institutional leaders and the public at large to make bet-
ter-informed decisions about the usefulness of ranking
mechanisms. Based on the discussion presented earlier,
the following general recommendations can contribute to
making the ranking exercise beneﬁcial to institutions,
governments, students, parents and the public at large, as
was its original intent.
Be clear about what the ranking actually measures.
Notwithstanding the ambiguities surrounding the con-
struct of quality, the organizations, government bodies,
or media that rank tertiary education institutions should
be explicit about what their deﬁnition of quality is. They
should also specify what is it they measure or do not
measure, the purpose of their ranking, and the audiences
for whom they are performing the ranking. The validity,
reliability, and comprehensiveness of selected indicators
can be better discerned in light of this information and
taking into account the scope of the academic tasks (for
example teaching, research, and so on) and the types of
institutions being assessed. Furthermore, they should
make the raw data based on which they determine the
ranking widely available and the calculation process
transparent so that the rankings they derive can be veriﬁed
independently.
Use a range of indicators and multiple measures rather
than a single, weighted ranking. The deﬁnition of qual-
ity in the context of tertiary education implies enabling
students to succeed in meeting their aspirations, the
expectations of society, the demands of governments,
business, and industry, and the standards set by profes-
sional associations (Gola, 2003). League tables should
thus use a wide range of indicators, which should place
greater emphasis on output and outcome indicators to
ensure that every dimension of quality is factored into
the evaluation. Multiple sets of indicators will yield mul-
tiple scores rather than a global score, thus bringing to
light areas of strengths as well as areas of weaknesses.
The inconsistency between ranking results of different
league tables and the absence of signiﬁcant differences
between institutions despite wide spreads in their posi-
tion relative to one another suggest that rank-ordering
entire institutions is meaningless. It is more appropriate
to rank in clusters of groups of institutions/programmes
as is done through the German approach or in keeping
with the Australian star approach than to assign a discrete
rank to each institution.
Compare similar programmes or institutions. Because of
their methodological limitations, rankings are more
meaningful the smaller the unit of comparison. Ranking
programmes is, therefore far preferable to ranking insti-
tutions. And if it is absolutely necessary to rank institu-
tions, care must be exercised to compare similar
institutions. This means going beyond looking at institu-
tions that are similar in name (university with university,
community college with community college) and mak-
ing sure that they are also similar in mission, organiza-
tion, and programme focus: for example, research
universities should be compared with research universi-
ties, teaching colleges and teaching colleges, and so on. 
At the institutional level, use rankings for strategic plan-
ning and quality improvement purposes. Tertiary educa-
tion institutions that look at detailed ranking data for
benchmarking purposes, whether within a single country,
across countries and over time, can use the results to
inform their strategic thinking and planning. Areas of
weakness and strength can thus be identiﬁed and correc-
tive actions deﬁned. The important point to bear in mind
is that individual universities should not agonize over
their overall rank per se or set themselves a speciﬁc rank
to beat, but rather should look at speciﬁc indicators in
order to better understand the determinants of their per-
formance and work towards improving the quality of
teaching, learning and research as may be the case.
At the government level, use rankings to stimulate a cul-
ture of quality. In countries that do not have a well-estab-
lished evaluation and/or accreditation system yet,
rankings can be used as a proxy for quality. To this end,
it is important to adopt a robust methodology based on
the principles described in the preceding paragraphs.
Involving the tertiary education institutions themselves
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in the deﬁnition of the methodology is important to cre-
ate a sense of ownership and common purpose. After
Nigeria introduced institutional rankings in 1999, there
was very little resistance because the University Grants
Commission in charge of the exercise had given the uni-
versities the opportunity to criticize and modify the crite-
ria that they did not agree with. 
Use rankings as one of the instruments available to
inform students, families and employers and fuel public
debates. Rankings that rely on multiple indicators rather
than a single weighted measure can provide useful infor-
mation about programmes to prospective students as well
as to employers in search of graduates with appropriate
professional and academic qualiﬁcations. But rather than
being considered as the ultimate measure of quality and
or relevance, rankings should be complemented by infor-
mation on accreditation and labour market outcome data
collected through surveys of employers and tracer sur-
veys. Finally, the results of league tables can also serve
to generate a national debate about long-term strategic
priorities and policies for tertiary education, as the French
example illustrated.
NOTES
1 The ﬁndings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in
this paper are entirely those of the authors and should not
be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, the mem-
bers of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries
they represent.
2 The authors wish to express their gratitude to Roberta Bas-
sett for her excellent research assistance. The authors also
wish to thank all the colleagues who kindly reviewed earlier
drafts and offered invaluable suggestions, in particular, Mar-
guerite Clarke, Sam Mikhail and Alex Usher. Full respon-
sibility for errors and misinterpretations remains, however,
with the authors.
3 SLATE: Organizational History, page 4. Retrieved from
http://www.slatearchives.org/orghist.htm, on 13 March
2006.
4 See for example www.ratemyprofessor.com.
5 Examples are: input variables (for example autonomy in
governance, resources allocated, CGPA of admitted stu-
dents, qualiﬁcations of faculty, available budgets, types of
programmes, and so on), process variables (for example
methods of instruction and assessment, educational experi-
ences of students, and so on), and most importantly, out-
come variables (for example graduate employment rates,
number of awards won by students and faculty, number of
publications, and so on). 
6 Maclean’s weekly news magazine which performs an
annual ranking of Canadian universities places them in one
of three categories: primarily undergraduate, comprehen-
sive, and medical-doctoral. The Carnegie classiﬁcation of
universities released ﬁve new classiﬁcation schemes for use
by the higher education community in November 2005. The
new classiﬁcations include all accredited, degree-granting,
non-specialized institutions of tertiary education in the
United States.
7 Austrian and Swiss universities are also included in the Ger-
man ranking prepared by CHE, the Centre for Higher Edu-
cation Development.
8 Institutions classiﬁed as Medical/Doctoral category have a
broad range of PhD programmes and research, as well as
medical schools. Those classiﬁed as Comprehensive have
extensive research activities and a wide range of pro-
grammes at the undergraduate and graduate levels, includ-
ing professional degrees. Those classiﬁed as Primarily
Undergraduate are largely focused on undergraduate edu-
cation, with relatively few graduate programmes.
9 From the title of an insightful article on ranking controver-
sies: Jennings, Matthew V. A Thin Line Between Love and
Hate, Currents, 30(9) (October 2004): 22–7.
10 The drop in Malaya University’s standing from the 2004
ranking can be in part attributed to extremely low scores
obtained on two indicators: citations per faculty and
recruiter review. ‘Recruiter review’is a new indicator intro-
duced in the 2005 ranking which reﬂects the opinion of
employers about the quality of graduates. The sample of
employers includes ﬁnancial institutions, airlines, manufac-
turers in areas such as pharmaceuticals and the automotive
industry, consumer goods companies, and ﬁrms involved in
international communications and distribution.
11 This account is based on interviews with Dutch Ministry of
Education officials who have asked not to be identiﬁed by
name because of the sensitive nature of the case.
12 ‘College and University Rankings’. Wikipedia. http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_rankings. Retrieved on 5
April 2006.
13 In 2004, ﬁve Canadian universities which topped the list in
terms of research funding included the University of Toronto
($623,532,000), McGill University ($543,497,000), Univer-
sité de Montréal ($383,764,000), University of British
Columbia ($363,337,000), and University of Alberta
($360,009,000). 
14 R&D expenditure as a percentage of total domestic R&D in
2003 was 35.7 per cent in Canada, 28 per cent in Australia
(2002 data), 21.4 per cent in the UK, 16.8 per cent in the US.
15 This Inventory was used in Australia.
16 These were: The Good Universities Guide (Australia), the
Guardian and The Times Higher Education Supplement
(UK), Maclean’s (Canada), and U.S.News and World Report
(USA).
17 The rankings are available on the CHE site at
http://www.che.de/cms/?getObject=2&getName=CHE-
Ranking&getLang=de as well as on the site of the German
Academic Exchange Agency at http://www.daad.de/
deutschland/studium/hochschulranking/04690.en.html
18 Based on direct observations and interviews conducted in
August 2005 and March 2006.
19 Interviews with Paulo Renato de Souza, both while he was
Minister of Education and after he left the position.
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